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Supreme Court as restrictive and narrow in scope. In interpreting the former
section 8(b) (4), the Court stated that the words "induce or encourage,"
are broader in scope and effectively prohibited peaceful picketing, while it
intimated that the words "restrain or coerce" would not have manifested such
intent.22 It must be assumed that Congress knew of the legal effect of these
words when it chose to use them. The wording of 8(b) (4) (ii) as finally
passed is the same as was analyzed by the Senate Committee, prohibiting
only "threatening, coercing, or restraining" a secondary employer engaged
in commerce. As pointing out in the Fruit Packers case, when Congress
wanted to prohibit picketing per se, it knew how to do so.28 This is
evidenced by section 8(13)(7) which forbids a union from picketing or
causing to be picketed, any employer, for a proscribed object.24 For these
reasons it is submitted that the correct interpretation of 8(b)(4)(ii) is
that of the Fruit Packers case.
Because of the decision in the Burr case, the intent of Congress in en-
acting 8 (b) (4) has been cast very much in doubt. It is a doubt that can be
removed only by a pronouncement of the Supreme Court, or by a clarification
by Congress.
GLEN B. SMITH
Labor Law—Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959—Challenging the Denial of an Equal Right to Nominate Under
§ 101.—Harvey v. Calboon. 1—Plaintiff, a member of the National Marine
Engineers' Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO, brought suit against the de-
fendant in his capacity as president of District No. 1 to enjoin the holding
of a union election. He alleged that the union had violated the rights guaran-
teed to him and others similarly situated, as union members, by Section
1.01(a) (1) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
19592 (hereafter referred to as the LMRDA). This method of enforcing
22 International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, supra note 18, at 703. The former
section 8(b) (4) has been retained by the Landrum-Griffin Act as 8(b)(4)(i). 73 Stat.
542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 158(6)(4) @) (Supp. IV, 1963).
Section 8(b) (4) (i) makes it an unfair labor practice "to engage in, or to induce
or encourage any individual. . . ."
28 Supra note 6, at 317.
24 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. I 158(b)(7) (Supp. IV, 1963). Section 8(b)(7)
reads:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents .
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer. . .
1 324 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 84 Sup. Ct. 633 (1964).
2 73 Stat. 520 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 	 411(a) (1) (Supp. IV, 1963). This section is
part of Title I, popularly referred to as "The Bill of Rights" section, and provides that:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges
within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or refer-
endums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to
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violations of section 10I(a) (1) is provided in section 102. 8 The complaint
stated that while the union by-laws allowed any member to nominate himself,
but only himself, for union office, the union's national constitution allowed
only an incumbent official or a five-year member with the requisite sea-time
(180 days, on vessels covered by union contract, in each of two of the
preceding three years) to be nominated or elected. The combined effect -
of these regulations was to preclude all members in the group which could
not hold office from being able to nominate an electable candidate. The
district court dismissed,' finding that plaintiff's complaint came under the
provisions of Section 401(e) of the LMRDA 5 exclusively, and that therefore
the only remedies open to him were those provided by section 402. 8 The
plaintiff ythen appealed. HELD: Reversed and remanded. The complaint
showed that plaintiff was denied an equal right to nominate candidates for
union office and therefore stated a cause of action under section 101(a) (1).
The court went on to hold that while such violations might also be found
to come under sections 401 and 402, the provisions of these sections do not
withdraw jurisdiction based on section 102.
The court based its decision on the fact that the complaint alleged
that members of a union had been denied an equal right to nominate.
If a member could only nominate himself, but he was ineligible for
office, that member had been shorn of any rights to nominate. Taken as
a whole then, the union's nominating procedures divided the union into
two groups: five-year members with the requisite sea-time, who could
nominate themselves, and the remainder who could only vote. With these
conditions present, the court stated, "it can hardly be asserted that the
members had 'equal rights and privileges . . . to nominate candidates.' " 7
Since the passage of the LMRDA there has been constant pressure in
the courts to bring nomination procedures under the protection provided
by sections 101 and 102, but the complainants have found the door closed
by the courts' wide use of sections 401(e) and 402. Section 401(e) refers
to nominating, as does section 101(a) (1), but seems to cover a wider area
of the election procedure than that of the latter section. Section 401(e)
participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings,
subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution
and by-laws.
3 73 Stat. 520 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. IV, 1963). In essence the provisions
of this section allow the aggrieved person to bring action for the appropriate relief
(including the enjoining of elections) in the local United States District Court.
4 221 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
5 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (Supp. IV, 1963). The section, part of
Title IV, covering elections, states "Iiln any election required by this section which
is to be held by secret ballot a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination
of candidates and every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate
and to hold office . . . and shall have the right to vote. . , ."
6 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482 (Supp. IV, 1963). In enforcing section 401(e),
this section requires that the complainant first exhaust any union remedies applicable
and then, if unsuccessful, file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who is to
investigate the allegation and file a complaint with the district court, if necessary,
to correct any violations found.
I Supra note 1, at 489.
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requires that "a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination
of candidates and . every member in good standing shall be eligible to be
a candidate. . . ." 8
 It is on the basis of this section that the courts have
dismissed complaints of nomination violations brought under section
101(a) (1).° However, only in Jackson v. NMEBAl° was there any question
of a denial of an equal right to nominate. In Jackson, implicitly overruled
by the present decision, the plaintiff challenged the same nominating and
eligibility requirements of the same union as in the instant case The district
court, though, instead of considering the procedures a unit as done by the
Harvey court, divided these into the self-nomination provision, which on
its face seems to make nominations as available as possible, and the
eligibility requirement, which the court believed fell under the provisions
Of section 401(e)." Looking at the election procedures in this separate
way there could not be found any denial of the equal right to nominate,
leaving section 401 as the only available sanction.
Cases, such as the present one, where a colorable violation of both
sections 101 and 401 is alleged, present the basic conflict brought on by the
interplay of section 101(a) (1) and section 401(e) and their respective
remedies. They resolve this conflict only by determining to what extent
the nomination protections presented by one of these sections interfere
with, and perhaps replace, those of the others. Two specific situations
relating to this issue have already been resolved. First, where the election
has already been held, the last sentence of section 403 12 makes it mandatory
that any complaint of a violation of nomination procedures be made
through the Secretary of Labor under section 402, rather than directly to
the district court." Second, where a member is challenging any union
constitution or by-law restriction on his right to be a candidate or an officer,
he must use the procedures of section 402. The courts have found that by
analysis most of the alleged nomination violations of section 101(a) (1) fall
into one of the above categories and have therefore been dismissed." Con-
tiguous with these interpretations is the fact that a prospective nominee
8 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 	 481(e) (Supp. IV, 1963).
9 Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 304 K2d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
823 (1962); Boling v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Tenn. 1963);
Jackson v. Nat'l Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n (hereinafter referred to as NMEBA).
221 F. Supp. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers, 201 F. Supp.
307 (D. Del. 1961), vacated as moot, 305 K2d 362 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
890 (1962); Gammon v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 199 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Ga. 1961);
Johnson v. San Diego Waiters' Union, 190 F. Supp. 444 (S. D. Cal. 1961).
19 221 F. Supp. 347, supra note 9.
11 Jackson v. NMEBA, supra note 9, at 348.
12 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 483 (Supp. IV, 1963).
13 Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers, supra note 9. See also, Kolmonen v. Int'l
Hod Carriers', 215 F. Supp. 703 (W.D. Mich. 1963).
14 Mamula v. United Steelworkers, supra note 9, at 109; Boling v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, supra note 9, at 20; Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers, supra note 9, at
363; Gammon v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 9, at 436; Johnson v. San Diego
Waiters' Union, supra note 9, at 447; Flaherty v. McDonald, 183 F. Supp. 300, 303
(S.D. Cal. 1960).
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suing in that capacity has no standing under section 102," but must bring an
action as a member.
In a case such as Harvey where a union member can successfully allege
that the union's nominating procedures have violated his rights to nominate,
the LMRDA presents him with a difficult problem of achieving the most
useful legislative remedy. If the violation is under section 101 he can obtain
an injunction to restrain the election under section 102, but if it is a violation
under section 401 he must wait until the election has been conducted and then
apply to the Secretary of Labor for relief under section 402.16 While the
remedy provided by section 402 appears to be complete and adequate, it can
have unfortunate consequences for the complainant. The election is held
despite the complaint and then the Secretary has two months in which to
investigate and bring the violation to court. The speedy remedy of a pre-
election injunction is lost, and in the weeks or months after the challenged
election, officers who were nominated and elected by a small percentage
of the union's members would be in command, to perhaps deny further rights
and benefits due the majority and to insure their own re-election.
Further, for the individual member who filed the original complaint, the
remedy provided for section 401(e) by section 402 may mean no remedy at
all. This latter section provides that once the Secretary has brought a civil
action on his complaint the court may not void the election unless "the
violation of section [401] may have affected the outcome of an elec-
tion. . . ."1] (Emphasis added.) Thus a court may find that one member's
rights have been denied under section 401, and yet leave that member with-
out a remedy. It is not therefore of molehill significance to know into which
section, 101(a) (1) or 401(e), an alleged violation falls.
We have seen what does not constitute a violation of a member's equal
right to nominate under section 101(a) (1), but what is protected by this
section? The instant case, the only one yet decided where a denial of the
equal right to nominate has been found, points out that the right to nominate
candidates for union office is curtailed when this right is dependent upon
membership classification, and that such is a violation of section 101(a) (1).18
However, based on other decisions, the legislative history of the act, and
the wording of the act itself, it seems that, despite the severity of union
restrictions on the eligibility to be a nominee or hold office, such restriction
will not be considered to be violations of section 101(a) (I) as long as
every member can nominate one of the eligible group. As stated in Jackson,
"It is the eligibility requirements which plaintiff attacks and these are
exclusively dealt with by section 401(e)."" There seems to be no other
way to interpret the words "equal rights .. . to nominate." To expand
15 Mamula v. United Steelworkers, supra note 9, at 112.
16 While it has been argued that violations of 	 101 raise a pre-election cause of
action, see Summers, Pre-Emption and the Labor Reform Act—Dual Rights and
Remedies, 22 Ohio St. L.J. 119, 135-40 (1961), the federal court decisions are to the
contrary, see Jackson v. NMEBA, supra note 9, at 348 and cases cited therein.
17 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. I 482(c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
is Supra note 1, at 489.
19 Jackson v. NMEBA, supra note 9, at 348. For similar statements see cases
cited supra note 9.
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this phrase to include an "equal, right ... to nominate whomever he desires"
would be a case of improper legislation by judicial interpretation. During
floor debate on the Bill of Rights section, the proponent stated that "under
this Bill of Rights title, a union member will be 'protected, as he should
be protected, in his rights to participate in all union activities. He will be
insulated against discriminatory treatment." 2° (Emphasis added.)
Thus the protection of section 101(a) (1) seems to be limited to a
member's right to participate in the nomination procedure, and not the
right to nominate a particular person. The Harvey court found that the
implicit classification of the membership was discriminatory treatment, and
it would seem that in the future the court will not find such violation of
section 101(a) (1) unless the complainant states that through some act of
the union he or a group of his fellow members were unable to participate
as nominators. The court in Jackson v. Intl Longshoremen's Ass'n, in
speaking of another right guaranteed by section 101(a) (1), found that
"Title I of the act does not, of course, guarantee .. . the right to vote
for a specific person, but guarantees only the right to vote for a duly
nominated and qualified candidate."21 The same statement, replacing "vote"
with "nominate," seems to be equally applicable to section 101(a) (1).
Section 401(e), as mentioned above, states with a great deal more detail
the safeguards a union must provide to its members in the nomination and
election procedure. It not only seems to cover the provisions of section
101(a) (1), but also governs complaints about the eligibility to be nominated.
Where it does conflict with section 101(a) (1), as it did in the present case,
the court correctly found that because of the importance Congress attached
to the provisions of section 101, Congress could not have meant the remedies
provided by section 402 to be exclusive. The very name of the section
"Bill of Rights" implies the emphasis Congress placed upon it (though
perhaps duplicating section 401) in its effort to guarantee union members
their rights "just as the rights of the American people are set forth in the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States." 22
E. CARL UEHLEIN, JR.
Labor Law—Railway Labor Act—Jurisdiction of National Mediation
Board Over Striking Employees of an Airline Employed at a Government
Nuclear Research Station.—Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
United Bbd. of Carpenters el Joiners. 1—In 1963, Pan American World
Airways contracted with the Atomic Energy Commission to perform "house-
keeping" and general support services at the Commission's Nuclear Research
Development Station, located in Jackass Flats, Nevada. The Station is devel-
20 Remarks of Sen. Kuchel in 2 Legislative History of LMRDA of 1959 at 1373
(1959).
21 212 F. Supp. 79, 82 (ED. La. 1962).
22 Remarks of , Sen. McClellan, supra note 20, at 1104..
1 324 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L. Week 3340-41 (U.S. March
31, 1964) (No. 725).
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